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Abstract
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers.
Investors have dispersed valuations, holding shares in rms they value more highly, and a
successful o¤er must win approval from the median target shareholder. We derive the con-
sequences for an acquiring rms takeover o¤er its size and cash/equity structure and
implications for takeover premia and rm returns. Cash o¤ers are best for the acquirer
when the acquirers own valuation exceeds the median target shareholders. Equity o¤ers
are best given the reverse. The acquirers share price always rises following cash acquisitions,
but can fall following equity o¤ers. The combined target-acquirer return is always higher
after cash acquisitions than equity acquisitions (which can be negative). We characterize
how synergies and uncertainty about target shareholder valuations a¤ect the optimal o¤er
and probability a takeover succeeds.
Keywords: Heterogeneous valuations; Mergers & Acquisitions; Optimal takeover
o¤ers; management guidance
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneity in beliefs, derived utility, tastes, etc. is a pervasive characteristic of many
economic settings. This is particularly true in nancial markets, where di¤erent investors
attach very di¤erent valuations to stocks, and some investors value their shares in a rm far
above the market price. Anecdotes indicating this can be drawn from messages on various
nancial chat rooms." 1 This paper integrates such investor heterogeneity into a theory of
takeovers, building an equilibrium model that accounts for heterogeneous investors on both
sides of the takeover. We investigate how the management of an acquiring rm should design
its takeover bid its size and cash/equity structure in light of its own private valuations,
and we derive the consequences for takeover premia paid, target and acquiring rm returns,
and likelihood of successful takeovers. We show how our model can reconcile a broader set
of empirical regularities than existing theories, and derive several new testable implications.
In our model, a potential acquirer develops a synergy with a target rm and would thus
gain from acquiring it. An acquisition o¤er consists of either an amount of cash in exchange
for a target shareholders ownership interest, or an equity stake in the joint (merged) rm. To
succeed, a takeover o¤er must win approval from a majority of shareholders. If the majority
agrees to sell their shares, the target is absorbed by the acquirer, becoming a single entity.
We capture the existing lack of consensus about a rms value by assuming that di¤er-
ent shareholders hold di¤erent private valuations of their rms (Miller, 1977, Chen, Hong
and Stein, 2002, and Bagwell, 1991 make similar assumptions).2 In practice, institutional
investors often substantially disagree over what a rms future earnings and hence future
share prices will be. One manifestation of this is the radically di¤erent one-year target share
1I would rather see PolyMedica Corporation (PLMD) continue to operate as a stand-alone company
than be taken over by something BIG in the near future. A takeover premium of lets say 20% would
certainly be nice, but its game over for us as stockholders in PLMD.... I have more faith in management
producing higher returns than that!" 15-Feb-06 03:41 am. Yahoo Message Board.
- PLMD closed at $43.43 on February 15, 2006. On August 28, 2007 Medco Health Solutions announced
it would buy PLMD in an all-cash deal worth $1.5 billion. The purchase price valued PLMD at $53 per
share, a 22% premium for that (presumably) disappointed shareholder.
2The literature on disagreement and di¤erences of opinion between investorsHarris and Raviv, 1993,
Morris, 1996adopts a related approach.
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prices set for the same stock by analysts at di¤erent institutional investors.3 We similarly
integrate private considerations for the management of the acquiring rm.
When valuations are heterogeneous, not only do a rms shareholders disagree on their
rms value, but shareholders also have higher valuations than non-holders, reecting that
investors establish positions in stocks they deem undervalued.A targets share price is de-
termined by the private valuation of its marginal shareholder, who values the rm the least.
A successful takeover o¤er, however, must win approval from the median shareholder who
attaches a higher private valuation to the target. It follows that successful takeover o¤ers
must be at a premium over the extant share price. This e¤ectively endows target sharehold-
ers with bargaining power, allowing the marginal shareholder to extract signicant rents
even when an acquirer makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er. Consistent with this prediction,
takeover premia are often high even when there is no evidence of other interested bidders
who might give rise to a bidding war (see Andrade et al., 2001, or Betton et al., 2008, for a
survey, or Fishman, 1988), so that one would expect an acquiring rm to be able to extract
substantial surplus in the absence of valuation heterogeneity at the target rm.
Beyond the simple prediction of takeover premia driven by investor heterogeneity, we
analyze the acquiring rms choice of whether to use cash or equity in its takeover bid.
Unlike cash o¤ers, equity o¤ers require an acquiring rms manager to cede some of his
private valuation for his rm, but allow target shareholders to retain greater stakes in the
target, and thus more of their private valuations. That is, equity o¤ers mandate a transfer of
private values from the acquiring rms management and shareholders to target rm share-
3Inspection of share price targets reveals that for larger rms (e.g., with market caps exceeding $50
Billion), which are potential acquirers, the range of price targets is roughly 35-40% of their share prices;
and for smaller rms with market caps between $100 million and $6 Billion that are potential targets the
range of disagreement over price targets typically exceeds the outstanding share price. Price targets are
higher relative to share price for the vast majority of smaller rms, indicating that in percentage terms,
private valuations of potential targets are both higher and more dispersed. Appropriately scaled year-ahead
earnings forecasts reveal similar levels of disagreement between institutional investors. Institutional
analysts have strong incentives to deliver accurate forecasts of earnings and share price targets those
who get them wrong are likely to be red, while those that do well receive large bonuses, either from their
employer or a competing institutional investor who hires them away. In our setting, these large di¤erences
in assessments translate into large di¤erences in private valuations. Papers that document upward-sloping
supply curves for shares (i.e., heterogeenity in investor valuations) in takeover contexts include Bagwell
(1992), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1987) and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007).
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holders. The optimal means of payment therefore hinges on the private valuation of the
acquirers manager relative to that of the median target shareholder cash is optimal when
the acquirers manager has a relatively high private valuation, and equity is optimal when
the median target shareholders valuation is relatively higher. Our prediction on the means
of payment emphasizes the contrast in private valuations of management at the acquirer
and the median shareholder at the target. This distinguishes it from theories that focus on a
managers desire to use equity when he believes the market overvalues his rm (Chatterjee,
John and Yan 2012), which, in e¤ect, is when the marginal shareholder valuation is high.
We establish that the return to the combined rm in a cash acquisition is always at
least as high as that in an otherwise identical equity acquisition. We then show that an
acquirers stock price can fall following an (optimal) equity o¤er, but not after a cash o¤er.
This reects that the interests of the acquiring rms management and its shareholders are
aligned with cash o¤ers, but not necessarily with equity o¤ers. In particular, management
and shareholders value cash similarly, so a cash o¤er that appeals to an acquiring rms
management also appeals to its shareholders. In contrast, with heterogeneous private val-
uations, they value equity di¤erently, and when the acquiring rms managements private
valuation is lower than that of its shareholders, it may make an equity o¤er that its share-
holders do not like. Moreover, equity o¤ers are attractive precisely when the valuation of
the acquiring rms management is lower than the median target shareholders, suggesting
that this circumstance is likely.
These predictions are consistent with Andrade et al. (2001), who nd that market reac-
tions to cash acquisitions are positive, but those to equity acquisitions are mostly negative.
Indeed, we nd that after an optimal equity o¤er, the combined rms share price can be less
than the sum of their pre-acquisition standalone share prices. This possible drop in market
assessment reects that pre-merger, investors hold the rms they value most. However,
when rms merge, investors must hold both rms, diluting their claims to their preferred
rms. As a result, combined acquirer-target returns can be negative when the synergies
driving an acquisition are not large enough to compensate investors for this dilution.
Our ndings provide an alternative explanation for the observed negative returns for ac-
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quirers. For instance, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) nd that around acquisition
announcements, acquiring-rm shareholders lose 12 cents per dollar spent on acquisitions.
Our explanation is driven only by valuation heterogeneity and does not rely on stock market
mispricing (as in Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), asymmetric information (as in Malmendier et
al., 2012), or irrationality. While not dismissing such possibilities, we o¤er a theoretical al-
ternative with fully rational, optimizing behavior driven by synergies associated with wealth
creation. Rather than solely being wealth destruction,our model suggests that the empiri-
cally observed negative acquirer and combined acquirer-target returns may merely be a man-
ifestation of what happens to the valuations of marginal shareholders. Related, we provide
an explanation for the so-called diversication discountfound by Berger and Ofek (1995),
Lamont and Polk (2001), and Graham et al. (2002) mergers between less-related rms
are associated with lower returns. Importantly, our analysis shows that this discount is not
necessarily due to low synergies, but may just reect larger di¤erences in valuations between
target and acquiring rm shareholders when the two rms come from less-related industries.
We then investigate the implications of the fact that a targets share price only reveals
the private valuation of its marginal shareholder, leaving potentially signicant uncertainty
about themedian valuation. As a result, an acquirer does not know exactly how much to bid
in order to assure itself of success. We show that if synergies are high enough, then increased
uncertainty about the median target shareholders valuation causes an acquirer to raise its
o¤er in order to reduce the likelihood that its o¤er is rejected and have the synergies go unre-
alized. If, instead, synergies are lower, increased uncertainty causes the acquirer to lower its
o¤er, since the cost of a failed o¤er is less and greater uncertainty increases the chance that
even a low o¤er might be accepted. Thus, whether uncertainty about target shareholder
valuations raises or reduces the optimal o¤er hinges crucially on the size of the synergies.
Most theories of takeovers do not provide a reason for why takeovers may fail. A corollary
of our ndings related to uncertainty about the median shareholders valuation is that o¤ers
fail with positive probability even when synergies are large enough that both the median
target shareholder and acquirer could benet from an acquisition. We also o¤er an expla-
nation for why takeover bids may be rejected even though target shareholders understand
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that rejection will cause their share price to fall the targets share price reects the value
of its marginal shareholder, the shareholder who most strongly favors the takeover, while a
takeovers success hinges on the assessment of the targets median shareholder.
We predict that a targets share price should always rise following a takeover o¤er that is
attractive to the marginal target shareholder who determines price, but which must also be
attractive to the median shareholder to succeed. Its share price will rise further if a takeover
succeeds, but fall if it fails. By contrast, an acquirers share price will move in the same di-
rection after a successful takeover as it moved after the announcement of the takeover o¤er.
If, instead, a takeover fails, we predict that share prices will return to their original levels.
These predictions allow us to distinguish empirically between our theory and theories based
on informational asymmetries that explain declines in an acquirers share price. Malmendier,
Moretti and Peters (2012) observe that when an acquiring rm has private information about
its value, equity o¤ers suggest that its stock is overvalued. Hence, its share price could fall
after an equity o¤er due to the bad news that it reveal. However, their subsequent predicted
share price dynamics di¤er from ours: their model predicts that an acquirers share price
should rise with approval as long as synergies are positive or target shareholder approval
reects a positive assessment by target shareholders, and fall when takeovers fail. Impor-
tantly, Savor and Lu (2009) provide support for our theory: they nd that in the three-day
window around an announcement that a takeover failed for exogenous reasons, the acquirers
share price rises by 3%, o¤setting the decline when the takeover was rst announced.
We next present the model, and analyze optimal equity and cash o¤ers. We then study
which type of o¤er the acquiring rm nds optimal, and derive the consequences for market
reactions. Following this, we analyze how the extent of uncertainty about the median share-
holders valuation a¤ects o¤ers, probability of success, and share price movements following
announcement and shareholder vote. Proofs are in an appendix.
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2 Base Model
Firms and Investors. The economy features a potential acquirer rm A and a potential
takeover target T . We normalize each rm to have one share outstanding. Our base model
focuses on two groups of risk-neutral investors who di¤er in their private valuations for the
two rms. One group of investors consists of types A 2 [0;1) who place values VA + A
on rm A and VT on rm T ; the other group of investors consists of types T 2 [0;1) who
place values VT +T on rm T and VA on rm A. Thus, a type j shareholder has a per-share
valuation j(j) = Vj + j for rm j = A; T .
For each j 2 fA; Tg, we denote the measure of type j investors by Yj () : [0;1) !
[0;Mj]; that is, Yj (j) denotes the mass of those type j investors whose private valuations
do not exceed j, and Mj denotes the total mass of all type j investors. Further, we denote
the cumulative wealth of type j investors with private valuations of at least j by ~Gj (j).
The function ~Gj () is related to type j investorsmeasure by the following:
~Gj (j) =
Z 1
j
Wj (z) dY (z) , (1)
where Wj () denotes the wealth density of type j investors.4 We assume that ~Gj(0) > Vj,
which will imply (see equation (2) below) that the marginal shareholders private valuation
j is strictly positive. This scenario (that j > 0) is more interesting than the other scenario
of j = 0 which would obtain if ~Gj(0)  Vj.
We assume for simplicity that investors have no other wealth and no borrowing is al-
lowed. Thus, an investor can invest any amount in each rm, up to his wealth limit. The
limited access to capital means that the highest valuation investor does not hold the entire
rm, giving rise to a downward sloping demand curve.5 Market clearing pins down the
4We simplify the presentation by assuming, as in equation (1), that all investors with a particular
private value have the same level of wealth (such that Wj () exists). However, note that our analysis does
not rely on equation (1), that is, our results hold generally without assuming all investors with a particular
private value have the same level of wealth.
5This formulation is standard when modeling heterogeneous shareholders (see Miller, 1977, or Bagwell,
1991). This reects that what is crucial for qualitative ndings is that the induced demand curves slope
down, and not the reasons why they do. One can alternatively provide primitives for downward sloping
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private valuation j of the marginal shareholder of rm j:
Vj + j = ~Gj
 
j

. (2)
Equation (2) reects optimization by investors: they will either not invest at all if all rms
are deemed to be overvalued, or invest all their wealth in the rm which they deem to be
most undervalued. Thus, a type j investor invests all his wealth in rm j if his private
valuation exceeds j, and invests in neither rm if his private valuation is below j.
The trading prices of the rms reect the valuations of their marginal holders:
Pj = Vj + j; j = A; T , (3)
or, after plugging in (2),
Pj = ~Gj
 
j

, j = A; T . (4)
From equation (4), the trading price of rm j does not reveal the exact form of ~Gj () except
for what is imposed by that equation. Thus, even conditional on observing the trading
price, uncertainties may exist concerning the form of ~Gj (), and in particular, uncertainties
may exist about the valuation of the median target shareholder, i.e., about the value of T
such that ~GT (T ) =
VT+T
2
, whose approval is required for a takeover to succeed. To capture
this uncertainty, we denote this conditional distribution over T by FT (), with associated
support [lT ; 
h
T ], where T < 
l
T < 
h
T . Intuitively, this uncertainty means that although the
acquiring rm can infer the valuation of the marginal shareholder from the market-clearing
stock price, it is unlikely to know the median target shareholders exact valuation.
Acquirer Managements Valuations and Information. Like its shareholders, the ac-
quirer management has a positive private valuation of rm A, attaching value VA+MA , where
MA > 0, but only values the target at VT . We interpret VA+
M
A as the managers assessment
of his rms long-term value. We assume that the manager maximizes the long-term prots
of shareholders based on his assessment of the rm value, or equivalently, the manager has
an equity stake in the rm and maximizes his own prot.
demand via risk averse agents whose private valuations enter mean returns. We forego this approach
because qualitative outcomes are unchanged, and takeover o¤ers then a¤ect stock-holding choices on the
intensive margin (how much to hold), rather than just on the extensive margin (with wealth constraints,
the choice becomes whether to hold), complicating analysis and presentation.
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Timing. The sequence of events is as follows. At t = 0, a synergy S > 0 develops between
rms A and T . Synergy S is public information and the valuation of the joint rm is addi-
tive for all investors. Thus, a type A investor values the joint rm at (VA + A) + VT + S.
At t = 1, the acquiring rms management makes an o¤er. At t = 2, target shareholders
decide whether to accept or reject the o¤er. The o¤er is accepted if and only if at least
50% of target shareholders vote in favor. We assume that following a favorable vote, there
is a freeze-out of non-tendered shares, and the target is absorbed by the acquirer. This as-
sumption mirrors general practice freeze-outs occur in over 90% of US and UK takeovers
(Gomes, 2001) in order to eliminate free riding.
Discussion. Our assumption that all acquiring-rm shareholders value the target at VT and
all target shareholders value the acquirer at VA eases presentation, but is unimportant for our
ndings. It is designed to capture the fact that even within narrowly-dened industries (e.g.,
biotechnology), few investors will have positive private values for any given pair of rms.
Here, the relevant pair is the target and acquirer. Section 5 relaxes this structure so that
some investors have private valuations of both rms, and shows how our results are robust.
Our model structure is designed to capture two key dimensions of valuation hetero-
geneities. First, j represents the di¤erence between how the marginal shareholder of rm j
values rm j and how the marginal shareholder in another rm values rm j: it measures
the extent to which shareholders of the two rms di¤er in their valuations of their respective
rms, and we will show that it is the driving force for the diversication discount that we nd.
Second, the di¤erence T   T in the valuations of the median and marginal target share-
holder is the key measure of dispersion in valuations among target shareholders, and drives
the o¤er premia. The standard empirical approach to measuring heterogeneity in investor
beliefs is to use the dispersion in analyst forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings (Moeller et al.,
2005, Chatterjee et al., 2012). However, our model suggests that empirical researchers might
additionally want to exploit the information in one-year-ahead share price targetsset by
institutional analysts to obtain a proxy for T   T . A measure of the median target share-
holder valuation T is the median of those price targets conditional on those price targets
exceeding the outstanding share price (as it is these institutional investors that plausibly
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hold the rm). This measure is more direct and may have less measurement error than
traditional measures.
Importantly for the ability of our model to match quantitatively the takeover premia
found in the data, the variation in share price targets and earnings forecasts is quite large
relative to the current share prices of potential takeover targets. For example, for moderate-
sized biotech rms, the range of price targets set by institutional investors often exceeds
the outstanding stock price. The implied large di¤erences in private values mean that our
model can reconcile the magnitudes of o¤er premia found in the data.
Di¤erences in private valuations tend to be high in percentage terms for young growth
stocks potential targets because small di¤erences in views (e.g., of the probability a drug
works) imply large di¤erences in discounted future cash ows. Arrival of information about
success or future customer bases may take years so there is no reason for these di¤erences
to be arbitraged away. Di¤erences in private valuations tend to be smaller in percentage,
albeit not absolute, terms, for larger rms with established revenue sources.
We assume away private valuations for synergies. None of our results are qualitatively
a¤ected as long as private valuations of synergies are small relative to those for a rms assets
in place.6 This is often the relevant scenario synergies are typically tiny relative to a rms
assets, so disagreements about their values should be similarly tiny. Indeed, synergies are
often well-understood. For example, the value-added to a biotech rm of a pharmaceutical
rms salesforce that informs doctors and coordinates delivery should be well-understood.
So, too, the value of access to internal capital is easy to assess, so that disagreements about
its value are likely to be small. Of course, one can imagine scenarios where synergies are
more di¢ cult to identify, for example because they may rely on cross-selling opportunities
between the acquirer and the target, in which case disagreements about the synergies may be
larger. Even then, our results apply as long as the disagreements related to the value of the
synergies do not overwhelm those associated with the standalone values of the rmsassets.7
6Following Proposition 3, we describe how the choice of optimal payment method is a¤ected if
disagreements about synergies are substantial.
7Note that we are not referring to uncertainty about the value of possible synergies, which may indeed be
large, but rather the extent of disagreement among investors regarding the distribution of possible synergies.
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To ease analysis, we assume that the takeover opportunity is unexpected. What matters
for our results is that it is not fully anticipated. The market response to takeover announce-
ments makes clear that this is the relevant scenario share prices would not move were the
takeover fully anticipated. If the market attaches a positive probability to a takeover, then
the pre-merger share prices account for it, reducing the absolute magnitudes of the predicted
return e¤ects that we nd, but not otherwise altering their qualitative properties.
3 Analysis
We rst examine equity and cash o¤ers assuming that the payment method (equity or cash)
is exogenously determined. We then endogenize the method of payment.
Exogenous Equity O¤ers. In an equity o¤er, an acquirer o¤ers I shares of the joint rm in
exchange for all of the target shares. We denote the valuation of the target shareholder who is
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er of I by E(I). This shareholders payo¤
is T = VT +E if the takeover fails. To determine his payo¤E if the takeover succeeds, note
that immediately after a successful equity o¤er, trade will occur if A 6= T , until the marginal
shareholders of the joint rm have the same private valuation. Denote the private valuation
of the marginal shareholder in the joint rm by ~J , where the tilde highlights that its real-
ization, which is between A and T , will hinge on the realized distributions of shareholder
wealth distributions, ~GA() and ~GT (). We decompose the di¤erent scenarios as follows:
(i) If E  ~J , then the median target shareholder will hold the joint rm, so his post-
takeover per-share payo¤ is E = VT+VA+S+E1+I I.
(ii) If E < ~J , then the median target shareholder will not hold the joint rm. Instead,
he will sell his shares at the market price, which is determined by the marginal holder of
the joint rm, so his (random) post-takeover per-share payo¤ is E =
VT+VA+S+~J
1+I
I.
Summing over the two possibilities, we have
E =
VT + VA + S + max (~J ; E)
1 + I
I.
That the eventual realization of synergies, or of their size, may be highly uncertain does not a¤ect our results.
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Then the indi¤erence condition T = E implies that E solves
VT + VA + S + max (~J ; E)
1 + I
I = VT + E. (5)
The value of ~J is pinned down by the market-clearing condition:
I
1 + I
 
1 
~GT (~J)
~GT (T )
!
(VT + VA + S + ~J) = GA (~J)  ~GA (A) if A > T (i) (6)
1
1 + I
 
1 
~GA (~J)
~GA (A)
!
(VT + VA + S + ~J) = ~GT (~J)  ~GT (T ) if T > A (ii).
To understand part (i) of (6), note that I
1+I
on the left-hand-side is the fraction of the joint
rm held by the original target shareholders,

1  ~GT (~J )~GT (T )

is the fraction of the original tar-
get shareholders who want to sell, and (VT + VA + S + ~J) is the joint rms market value.
Thus, the left-hand-side is the total dollar amount that those original target shareholders
(who wish to sell) can sell for, which must equal the right-hand-side, which is the total wealth
of those type A investors who will buy the joint rm. Part (ii) of (6) follows from a similar
structure. The system of equations, (5) and (6), jointly determine the values of I and ~J .
To simplify presentation, we assume:
A1. The indi¤erent target shareholder in an equity o¤er has a higher private valuation
than the marginal acquiring rm shareholder: E  A.
Approval of a takeover hinges on the median target shareholders valuation. When
T > A, then even when all acquiring rm shareholders continue to hold the joint rm, so
do at least half of the target shareholders (weighted by wealth), including the median target
shareholder. We believe that this is typically the relevant scenario, i.e., that assumption A1
captures most real world settings.8 In this case, equation (5) simplies to
I =
VT + E
VA + S
. (7)
The acquiring rms manager chooses I to maximize his expected payo¤s, balancing the
tradeo¤ that a higher o¤er, although more costly, is more likely to succeed. If a takeover suc-
8Section 3.1 provides a su¢ cient condition under which A1 holds for an optimal equity o¤er.
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ceeds, the joint rms market value reects the value attached by its marginal shareholder:
gMV J = VT + VA + S + ~J = PT + PA + S + ~J   A   T . (8)
Because ~J is always less than max fA; Tg, the (random) market value of the joint rm,gMV J , is always less than the sum of the two rmspre-merger valuations, PT + PA, when-
ever the synergy is small relative to the marginal shareholders valuation, i.e., whenever
S < min fA; Tg. We denote the combined return over the takeover window from holding
equal positions in the acquirer and the target by ~RE:
~RE =
gMV J
PT + PA
  1 = PT + PA + S + ~J   A   T
PT + PA
  1 = S + ~J   A   T
PT + PA
. (9)
Recalling that min fA; Tg measures the extent to which shareholders of the two rms
di¤er in their valuations of their respective rms, we have the following result:9
Result 1 The combined acquirertarget return ~RE following an equity acquisition is nega-
tive if the synergy S is less than min fA; Tg. If, instead, the synergy S exceeds max fA; Tg,
the combined acquirertarget return is positive.
Thus, the combined return is negative if the synergy is less than the heterogeneity in
valuations between shareholders of the two rms. This result reects that a merger forces in-
vestors to hold rms they may otherwise not hold, diluting their claims to their favorite rms.
The share price of the joint rm is:
~PJ =
gMV J
1 + I
=
VT + VA + S + ~J
1 + I
. (10)
Interpreting ~PJI as the cash equivalent of the equity o¤er, we have:
Proposition 1 Suppose A  T . Then, any equity o¤er that is accepted by a majority of
target shareholders has a cash equivalent that is at a premium over the targets market value:
~PJI
 > PT .
9The result follows from the relation min fA; T g  ~J  max fA; T g.
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The intuition for this premium is that a takeover dilutes a target shareholders claim to
the target he now only has a claim of I
1+I
to his private valuation T for which he must be
compensated. This dilution a¤ects every target shareholder, but the resulting loss is more
severe for the median target shareholder than the marginal shareholder. When the median
target shareholder is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting, the marginal target share-
holder, who determines the prices of the target and joint rm, must be strictly better o¤.
Together, the continuity of payo¤s and the strict inequality imply that the result extends
as long as T is not too much larger than A.
10 Empirically, the acquiring rm is typically
larger than the target, in which case the su¢ cient conditions for the result hold as long as
private valuations do not decrease too rapidly in the common value component of the rm.
We believe the opposite scenario is far more common. Accordingly, we now assume
A2: Monotonicity. The private valuation of the marginal shareholder in the acquiring
rm, A, and the size of synergies S are nondecreasing in VA.
A2 delivers an unambiguous interpretation of rms with larger market capitalization:
they have both larger private value and common value components. Under A2, when VA
increases, the joint rm becomes more expensive and the fraction of the joint rm o¤ered
to the target falls. Thus, target shareholdersclaims to the target are further diluted. In
turn, the cash equivalent of the o¤er must rise to compensate for the greater dilution:
Result 2 Under A2, in a successful equity o¤er, the cash equivalent ~PJI increases in VA.
The proof of Proposition 1 establishes Result 2 in the simplied setting where the ac-
quirer knows the median target shareholders valuation (i.e., where hT   lT is small). This
novel prediction can reconcile Moeller et al.s (2007) empirical nding that shareholders in
smaller acquiring rms earn systematically more in acquisitions.
Noting that ~PJI is also the targets stock price after a takeover, Proposition 1 implies:
Result 3 Suppose A  T . Then in a successful equity o¤er, the targets return RT =
I ~PJ PT
PT
is always positive.
10This holds for our subsequent results that also assume A  T .
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In contrast, the acquirers return after a successful equity takeover, RA = PJ PAPA , can be
negative. To see this, substitute I from (7) into (10) to obtain the joint rms share price,
~PJ =
VT + VA + S + ~J
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S) . (11)
Note from equation (11) that ~PJ < VA + S because E > J means that the ratio of the
relative valuations of the marginal and median target shareholder, VT+VA+S+~J
VT+VA+S+

E
, is less than
one. Therefore, from equation (3), if S < A, then ~RA =
~PJ PA
PA
< 0, i.e., the acquirers
return is negative whenever the synergy is small. Indeed, even when S > A, the acquirers
return can still be negative when there is enough dispersion in target shareholder valuations
that 

E ~J
VT+VA+S+

E
(VA + S) is large. Thus, our model can reconcile the negative returns for
acquirers that Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005) nd. Further, the combined return
is negative when the synergy is small (Result 1), while the targets return is always positive
(Result 3). These results will hold when we endogenize the acquiring rms optimal o¤er.
Exogenous Cash O¤ers. With a cash o¤er, the acquirer o¤ers cash C to target share-
holders in exchange for all of their shares. We denote by C(C) the valuation of the target
shareholder who is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting. Immediately after a success-
ful cash acquisition, the joint rm is held only by the acquiring rms shareholders, while
all type T investors hold cash. Then, since type A and T investors value the joint rm at
VA + VT + S  C + A and VA + VT + S  C + T respectively, any target shareholders with
private values T > A will purchase claims to the joint rm from marginal acquiring rm
shareholders. This transaction results in a new marginal holder of the joint rm, one with
a higher private valuation. Therefore, the share price of the joint rm will satisfy
~PJ > VA + VT + S   C + A. (12)
Rearranging (12) yields ~PJ + C > VA + VT + S + A. Hence, provided that A  T , the
combined return is
~RC =
~PJ + C
PA + PT
  1 > VA + VT + S + A
PA + PT
  1 = S   T
PA + PT
 S + ~J   A   T
PA + PT
= ~RE,
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where we use the fact that ~J lies between A and T . Summarizing, we have:
Result 4 Suppose that A  T . Then, ceteris paribus, the combined acquirer and target
return in a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity acquisition.
As we noted earlier, the acquiring rm is typically larger than the target. If j increases
in Vj, then this would suggest that A  T in most situations. When this is so, the result
shows the combined acquirer and target return in a cash acquisition exceeds that in an equity
acquisition. This result reects the fact that the private valuation of the marginal holder of
the joint rm in a cash o¤er exceeds A, whereas that marginal valuation in an equity o¤ers
is between A and T . These results can explain the empirical nding that, in most takeovers,
the combined returns in cash o¤ers exceed those in equity o¤ers (Andrade et al., 2001).
To determine the optimal o¤er, C, note that just after a successful cash o¤er, former
shareholders of the target for whom VA+VT +S+T C > ~PJ wish to buy shares in the joint
rm. Analogously, original shareholders of the acquiring rm for whom VA+VT+S+A C <
~PJ want to sell. Market clearing determines ~PJ . There are two possible situations:
(i) If VT+VA+S C
+C
~PJ
> 1, the median target shareholders private valuation exceeds that
of the marginal shareholder of the joint rm. Thus, the median target shareholder derives
an added benet by holding C

PJ
shares of the joint rm for each share held in the target,
receiving a per-share payo¤ of (VT + VA + S   C + C) C

PJ
> C from the takeover.
(ii) If VT+VA+S C
+C
~PJ
 1, then the median target shareholder will not hold the joint
rm, so his post-takeover per-share payo¤ is C.
As the o¤er C leaves the target shareholder with value C indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting, the indi¤erence conditions corresponding to these two scenarios yield:
VT + 

C =
VT + VA + S   C + C
~PJ
C if
VT + VA + S   C + C
PJ
> 1 (i) (13)
VT + 

C = C
 otherwise. (ii)
Equation (13) (i) reveals that if the marginal joint rm shareholder has a lower private
valuation than the median target shareholder, then C < VT + C , i.e., the optimal cash
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o¤er is less than the median target shareholders valuation. The median target shareholder
uses the cash received for his shares to purchase shares in the joint rm at its market price,
which is determined by the marginal holder of the joint rm. As the marginal joint rm
shareholder has a lower private valuation than the median target shareholder, this purchase
provides the median target shareholder with an added private benet, making him willing to
tender at a lower price (as do all shareholders with lower valuations). In Lemma 1 we relax
assumption A1 in order to identify su¢ cient conditions for the median target shareholder
to hold and not to hold the joint rm in cash o¤ers, respectively:
Lemma 1 Dene ~FA ()  1   ~GA()VA+A for  2 [A; A]. With an optimal cash o¤er, if
(VA + S) ~FA
 
min

lT ; A
	
> VT + 
h
T , the original median target shareholder holds the joint
rm, and C < VT + C. If, instead, A > 
h
T , the original median target shareholder does
not hold the joint rm, and C = VT + C.
To understand the intuition for Lemma 1, note that ~FA () is the number of shares of the
acquiring rm held by A-type investors with private valuation below . The rst part of the
lemma essentially says that if the value of the synergies plus the market value of the portion
of the acquiring rm held by shareholders whose private valuations are less than the median
target shareholders is large relative to the targets market value, then ~PJ becomes high rela-
tive to the cash that target shareholders receive. As a result, target shareholders do not pur-
chase enough of the joint rm to drive its price up past the value to the original median target
shareholder. The second part of the lemma follows from (12): in the less plausible scenario
where the private valuation of the marginal holder of the acquiring rm always exceeds the
median target shareholders value, the median target shareholder will not hold the joint rm.
When the median target shareholder holds the joint rm, the cash o¤er that makes him
indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting is less than his valuation of the target, VT + C .
Proposition 2 shows that even when this is so, the o¤er still exceeds the target rms pre-
acquisition price, PT = VT + T , as long as the acquirers market value is high enough. This
is because then the joint rm is expensive, so the median target shareholder only purchases
a small claim and the added private benet received is small. Thus, to make him indi¤erent,
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a premium relative to the pre-acquisition price must be o¤ered. Indeed, as the acquirers
market value grows arbitrarily larger than the targets, the o¤er approaches VT + C :
Proposition 2 Suppose A  T . Then in a successful cash o¤er, the o¤er represents a
premium if the acquirer is larger than the target. More precisely, if VA > PT   S then
PT < C
  VT + C : (14)
Further, as the acquirers market value grows arbitrarily larger than the targets value, the
o¤er approaches the pre-acquisition value of the median target shareholder, VT + C:
lim
VT+
h
T
VA+S
(hT T )!0
C   (VT + C) = 0. (15)
Corollary 1 Suppose A  T . Then the targets return is positive in a successful cash
acquisition if VA > PT   S.
Boone and Mulherin (2007) report that the mean ratio of the target-to-bidder equity
value is 0.45, and the median ratio is only 0.27. Miao and Hackbarth (2007) document
that the acquirer is especially likely to be larger than the target in cash acquisitions. Thus,
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 apply to most cash acquisitions.
3.1 Optimal Payment Method
We now let the acquirer choose the type of o¤er cash, equity, no o¤er to make.11 We
rst examine an acquiring rm managers willingness to make an equity o¤er. Prior to a
takeover, his per-share payo¤ is AM = VA + AM ; if an o¤er I is accepted, his post-merger
per-share payo¤ is VT+VA+S+
M
A
1+I
. Thus, the managers expected per-share payo¤ is
EAM (I) = Pr(E(I)  T )
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
1 + I
+ Pr(E(I)  T )
 
VA + 
A
M

], (16)
where Pr(E(I)  T ) is the probability that o¤er I is approved. That is, E(I) is the indif-
ferent shareholder given o¤er I, as determined by the system of equations (5) and (6), and
11In practice, an acquirer may not always be able to choose between cash or equity o¤ers; for example,
nancial constraints may mandate equity o¤ers. Our main results extend to those situations.
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Pr(E(I)  T ) is the probability that E(I) exceeds the median target shareholders valua-
tion, which is necessary for an o¤ers approval. The optimal o¤er I maximizes EAM , trading
o¤ between the probability of winning and the size of the payo¤ when a takeover succeeds.
We now enrich the structure in Assumption A1 slightly. To guarantee that the median
target shareholder holds the joint rm following an optimal equity o¤er it su¢ ces that:
A3: The median target shareholders private valuation always exceeds the private valuation
of the marginal acquiring rm shareholder: lT  A.
Because ~J  maxfA; Tg, Assumption A3 ensures that ~J  E(I). This is still
a stronger structure than we need for the median target shareholder to hold the joint
rm following the optimal o¤er: typically the optimal o¤er risks failure and targets some
E > 
l
T . With this structure, the probability that an optimal equity o¤er is accepted is
just Pr(E(I)  T ) = FT (E(I)). Substituting for I using equation (7), and omitting the I
index on E, we write the acquiring managers expected per-share payo¤ as:
EAM (E) = FT (E) (VA + S)

VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + E

+ (1  FT (E))
 
VA + 
A
M

. (17)
Without loss of generality, we focus on E 2

lT ; 
h
T

because an o¤er that exceeds hT
always wins, and thus is dominated by o¤ering hT ; and o¤ering less than 
l
T always loses,
and is thus equivalent to o¤ering lT . For the optimal o¤er to make the acquirer manager
strictly better o¤ (i.e., EAM (

E) > AM), it must have a strictly positive probability of being
approved by a majority of target shareholders (i.e., E > 
l
T ). The converse is also true:
Lemma 2 The optimal equity o¤er has a positive probability of being approved by a majority
of target shareholders if and only if it renders the acquirer manager strictly better o¤.
In order for EAM (

E) > AM , synergies must be large enough to compensate the manager
for the dilution in his claim to the private valuation of his rm:
Lemma 3 The optimal equity o¤er has a strictly positive probability of being approved by
a majority of target shareholders if
S  VT + S + 
h
T
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
hT . (18)
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If, instead,
S  VT + S + 
l
T
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
lT , (19)
then any o¤er that the acquiring rms management would like target shareholders to ap-
prove has zero probability of being approved (i.e., E = 
l
T ).
The rst half of the lemma says that a su¢ cient condition for an optimal equity o¤er to
be accepted with positive probability is that synergies are high enough that there is posi-
tive surplus from a takeover even when the median target shareholder has the high private
valuation, hT . The second half says that a su¢ cient condition for optimal equity o¤er to
always be rejected is that synergies are low enough that there is no surplus from a takeover,
even when the median target shareholder has the low private valuation, lT .
Now suppose that it is optimal for the acquirer to make a cash o¤er C. Then its man-
agers expected per-share payo¤ would be:
CAM (C) = Pr(C(C)  T )
 
VT + VA + S + 
M
A   C

+ (1  Pr(C(C)  T ))
 
VA + 
A
M

],
(20)
where C(C) is the value of C corresponding to C. The optimal C maximizes CAM . As
with equity, the acquiring rms manager must gain from a successful cash o¤er:
Lemma 4 The optimal cash o¤er C has a positive probability of being approved by a ma-
jority of target shareholders if and only if CAM (C
) > AM .
From equation(20), the acquirer managers per-share expected prot is
CAM (C)  AM = Pr(C(C)  T ) (VT + S   C) . (21)
This, combined with C  VT + C(C), yields a lower bound on the managers prot:
CAM (C)  AM  Pr(C   VT  T ) (VT + S   C) (22)
= FT (C   VT ) (VT + S   C) . (23)
Equation (23) and the optimality of C yield a su¢ cient condition for the acquiring rms
manager to make a cash o¤er:
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Lemma 5 An optimal cash o¤er by the acquiring rms management has a strictly posi-
tive probability of being approved by a majority of target shareholders if synergies exceed the
lower bound on the private valuation of the median target shareholder, i.e., if S  lT .
We next examine when each type of o¤er is optimal. The choice between cash and
equity boils down to whether CAM (

C) > 
E
AM (

E), in which case a cash o¤er is made,
or CAM (

C) < 
E
AM (

E), in which case an equity o¤er is optimal. Cash and equity have
competing merits. Equity o¤ers require an acquiring rms manager to cede some of his
private valuation for his rm. This works in favor of using cash and the e¤ect rises with the
managers valuation for his rm, MA . Conversely, equity o¤ers allow target shareholders to
retain stakes in the target and thus some of their private valuations. This works in favor of
using equity and the e¤ect rises with the median target shareholders valuation, T . There
is one additional e¤ect in play with cash o¤ers: as long as the price of the joint rm is less
than the median target shareholders valuation, the median target shareholder derives an
added private benet from holding the joint rm, which allows the acquirer to reduce its
o¤er, making a cash o¤er more attractive.
The resulting choice of means of payment depends on how the private valuation of the
acquirers management compares to that of the median target shareholder (as equity o¤ers
trade claims to private values from the acquirer to target shareholders), and how the private
valuation of the marginal holder of the acquiring rm compares to that of the median target
shareholder (due to the consequences for share purchases by the median target shareholder).
We show that if MA > 
h
T , then an acquiring rms management prefers a cash o¤er to equity
o¤ers, but equity o¤ers become more attractive when MA is small:
Proposition 3 If the acquirer managers private valuation always exceeds the median tar-
get shareholders (i.e., if MA  hT ), then he prefers a cash o¤er to an equity o¤er, i.e.,
CAM (C
)  EAM (I). If, instead, (a) the median target shareholders private valuation
always exceeds the acquirer managers, i.e., if MA  lT , and (b) following the optimal cash
o¤er, the median target shareholder does not hold the joint rm (e.g., if hT  A), then the
acquirer prefers to make an equity o¤er, i.e., EAM (I
)  CAM (C).
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To gain intuition, consider the simple case in which T is known with certainty and the
median target shareholder derives no private benets from holding the joint rm (e.g., if
T  A). Regardless of whether equity or cash is used, the acquiring rms optimal o¤er
leaves the median target shareholder indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er.
Thus, the acquiring rms management prefers cash to equity if and only if the sum of its
payo¤plus that of the median target shareholder is higher with cash. Equity and cash o¤ers
di¤er in their impacts on the loss of private valuations in a merger. With equity, the acquirer
holds a fraction 1
1+I
of the joint rm and the target holds the remaining fraction I
1+I
. Hence,
the total loss of private valuation with an equity o¤er is I
1+I
MA +
1
1+I
T . In contrast, the
loss with a cash o¤er is T (given our premise that the median target shareholder does not
hold the joint rm). Thus, the loss with the equity o¤er is greater if and only if
I
1 + I
MA +
1
1 + I
T  T , MA  T ;
which is exactly the condition from the proposition.
Existing theories (e.g., Chatterjee, John and Yan 2012) predict that a manager wants
to use equity when the market overvalues his rms equity. Proposition 3 is consistent with
such theories in that it shows that equity is preferred when an acquirers private valuation is
low relative to its marginal shareholders private valuation  (i.e., its equity is overvalued).12
However, our analysis provides additional insights. Proposition 3 shows that the choice
between cash and equity should also reect the private valuations of target shareholders:
equity is preferred to cash when the acquiring rms manager has a low private valuation
relative to the median target shareholder. Thus, the targets market value, as determined
by its marginal shareholder, does not directly enter this calculation.
Proposition 3 establishes that the acquirer is more likely to use cash if its managers
private valuation for his rm is higher. Empirically, one can interpret the acquiring rms
manager as its CEO. As long as the size of the managers stake in his rm increases with
his private valuation, we have the following novel testable prediction:
12Proposition 3 presumes that all parties agree on synergies. If, instead, acquirer management and target
shareholders disagree, then when the acquirer perceives higher synergies than do target shareholders, it
favors the use of cash (all else equal) because equity becomes more costly for the acquirer. Conversely,
when the acquirer perceives lower synergies than do target shareholders, it raises the attraction of equity.
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Corollary 2 The greater is the acquirer managers holding of his company, the more likely
the acquirer is to o¤er cash.
3.2 Stock Price E¤ects of Optimal O¤ers
Having derived how an acquiring rms manager designs his optimal o¤er we now show that
an optimally-chosen equity o¤er may succeed, and yet cause the acquirers stock price to fall.
Endogenous Equity O¤ers. We rst analyze endogenous (optimal) equity o¤ers that are
strictly preferred by the acquiring rms management to all cash o¤ers (and no o¤ers). We
rst consider the returns to the target. Recalling that the target return in an optimal equity
acquisition is always positive if A  T , we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose A  T . Then, a target rms share price rises following a suc-
cessful equilibrium equity acquisition.
We now contrast this positive return for target shareholders with what acquiring rm
shareholders may experience:
Lemma 6 Suppose A3 holds and that A  T . Then following a successful optimally cho-
sen equity o¤er, the acquiring rms share price falls, i.e., ~PJ < PA, if the synergies are
small enough that
S < A + (
l
T   A)
VA + S
VT + VA + S + lT
. (24)
The condition for the acquirers stock price to fall following a successful equity o¤er is
that the synergy be too small to compensate the marginal acquiring rm shareholder for
the dilution to his private valuation. We now use this result to characterize the possible
returns associated with endogenous equity o¤ers. We establish the stronger result that not
only may the acquirers share price fall following an optimal equity o¤er, but it can fall by
so much that the combined acquirer and target return is negative.
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Proposition 5 If MA < A, then the combined acquirer and target return can be negative,
i.e., RE < 0, following an optimal equity o¤er that the acquiring rms management strictly
prefers to any cash o¤er and to no o¤er.
The direct corollary of Propositions 4 and 5 is:
Corollary 3 If MA < A, then the acquiring rms share price can fall, i.e., ~PJ < PA, fol-
lowing an optimal equity o¤er that the acquiring rms management strictly prefers to any
cash o¤er and to no o¤er.
Proposition 5 reveals that a negative combined return does not mean that a merger de-
stroys wealth. Rather, combined returns can be negative even when synergies are positive
because pre-merger, shareholders hold the rms they value most, but post-merger, they must
hold both rms, diluting their claims to their preferred rms. From equation (8), the result-
ing value loss" is A + T   ~J  S. For instance, if A = T  , then the value loss is  S.
The size of the lost value to an acquiring shareholder depends on his private valuation
and the extent of the dilution of his claim to that private valuation. For this loss to occur
following an optimal equity o¤er, it must be that the private valuation of the acquiring rms
management is less than that of its marginal shareholders. Then, the marginal shareholder
su¤ers a loss when its managements payo¤ is positive, but su¢ ciently small. Further, the
attraction of equity o¤ers relative to cash o¤ers rises when MA is smaller precisely because
the acquiring rms management does not mind diluting its private valuation by as much.
Here, MA << A captures shareholders who attach higher valuations to the rms assets
than management.13 More generally, more extensive investor heterogeneity, as captured by
a larger value of A, can cause the acquiring rms share price to fall.
These results provide a novel explanation for the diversication discountobserved in
mergers of conglomerates in di¤erent industries: the value loss need not be because the syn-
13Agency considerations (e.g., a managers empire building motives) could also lead to a decrease in the
acquirers return, just as when the managers private valuation di¤ers from target shareholders. However, a
di¤erence exists: presumably, a managers private benet of control does not vary with the payment method,
so agency considerations do not have the same di¤erential implications for the choice between cash and
equity that di¤erences between a managers private valuation and that of the median target shareholder do.
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ergies are small or even negative, but rather because shareholders in the two rms di¤er more
substantively in their valuations, i.e.,  is larger reecting that the conglomerates are more
dissimilar. That is, the diversication discount may reect large di¤erences in valuations
between target and acquiring rm shareholders of each others rm, and not low or negative
synergies. Section 5 investigates this diversication discount in more detail, showing how
the magnitude of the discount depends on the similarity" between the merging rms.
Endogenous Cash O¤ers. We now analyze endogenous cash o¤ers. These o¤ers (a) max-
imize the payo¤ of the acquiring rms management (i.e., C is optimally chosen), (b) have
positive probabilities of being approved (i.e., C > 
l
T ), and (c) are preferred to equity o¤ers.
We highlight a sharp contrast between optimal equity and cash o¤ers: unlike equity o¤ers,
any cash o¤er that is individually rational for an acquiring rms manager is also preferred
by its marginal shareholder. As a result, for endogenous cash o¤ers, we have:
Proposition 6 An acquiring rms share price always rises following a successful equilib-
rium cash acquisition.
Intuitively, all parties value cash in the same way. Hence, a cash o¤er that appeals to
the acquiring rms management also appeals to its shareholders, so the joint share price in-
creases. This result is consistent with Andrade et al.s (2001) empirical nding that acquiring
rmsshare prices tends to drop following stock acquisitions, but not cash acquisitions.
We now compare combined acquirer and target returns in cash and equity acquisitions.
Recall that when the payment method was exogenous and A  T , then the combined
return in a cash acquisition exceeded that in an equity acquisition (Result 4), and the tar-
gets return was positive (i.e., the targets share price rises) as long as the target was not
much larger than the acquirer (Corollary 1). These results extend when the acquiring rms
manager selects his preferred payment method:
Proposition 7 Consider two equilibrium takeovers with the same values of VA; VT ; S; A; T
where A  T , but di¤erent values of MA , so that one acquisition is with equity and the other
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is with cash. Then the combined return in the cash acquisition exceeds that in the equity
acquisition.
Proposition 8 Suppose A  T . If VA > PT   S, then a target rms share price rises
following a successful equilibrium cash acquisition.
Combining Propositions 5-8 reveals that, consistent with empirical ndings, cash acqui-
sitions are associated with positive and higher returns than equity acquisitions, the target
experiences positive returns, but equity acquisitions can be associated with negative com-
bined acquirer-target returns, even when equity acquisitions are optimal. Thus, we derive
a number of restrictions on the data that are unique to our theory.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we impose additional structure in order to derive comparative static char-
acterizations. Specically, we assume that A = T  , and that the median target share-
holders private valuation, T , is uniformly distributed on [^  ; ^+ ]. The expected pri-
vate valuation, ^, of the median target shareholder measures the extent of heterogeneity
in valuations between target and acquiring rm shareholders; while  measures the extent
to which an acquiring rm is uncertain about the private valuation of the median target
shareholder, and ^   >  reects that the acquiring rm knows the marginal shareholder
valuation, which bounds its uncertainty over T . We focus on cash o¤ers (which would en-
dogenously arise if, for example, MA is large enough); equity o¤ers have qualitatively similar
features. To avoid the complications in cash o¤ers when the median target shareholder
derives private benets from holding the joint company, we assume that VT+^+
VA+S
<< 1, in
which case we can approximate this additional private benet as zero.
For any cash o¤er C, the tendering decision of a target shareholder with private valuation
 is simple: accept if and only if C  VT + . The probability that an o¤er C is accepted is
Pr (C) =
8><>:
1 if C VT (^ )
2
> 1
C VT (^ )
2
if 0 < C VT (^ )
2
 1
0 if C VT (^ )
2
 0:
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Without loss of generality, we focus on o¤ers where C 2 [VT + ^  ; VT + ^+ ]. As a
function of C, the expected payo¤ of the acquiring rms management is:
A = Pr (C) (VT + S   C) +
 
VA + 
M
A

=
C   VT   ^+ 
2
(VT + S   C) + VA + MA :
The rst term is the expected increment in value associated with a successful takeover o¤er,
while the second term is the status quo (no acquisition) value. Di¤erentiating with respect
to C yields the rst-order condition describing the optimal o¤er:
dA
dC
= 0 =
S + ^+ 2VT     2C
2
: (25)
Since the second-order conditions are satised, (25) denes a global maximum. In addition,
if the optimal o¤er C exceeds VT + ^ , the o¤er must be individually rational because the
acquiring rm could always o¤er C = VT + ^    and have its o¤er be rejected. Allowing
for a boundary solution, the general solution for the optimal o¤er C is
C =
8<:
no o¤er if S < ^  
VT +
S+^ 
2
if ^   < S < ^+ 3
VT + ^+  if S  ^+ 3:
(26)
Proposition 9 When the acquiring rms beliefs about the median target shareholders pri-
vate valuation are uniformly distributed,
 The optimal o¤er C rises with the degree ^ of heterogeneity in private valuations of
target shareholders.
 C increases with the synergy, S.
 If synergies are small, S  ^, then C decreases with the extent of uncertainty .
 If synergies are large, S > ^, then C rst rises with  and then falls, reaching a
maximum at  = S ^
3
.
The result that C rises with the degree of heterogeneity in private values of target
rm shareholders reects the central intuition of our paper: a successful o¤er must win
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approval from at least 50% of shareholders, who have higher valuations than the marginal
shareholder that determines the price. The result that C rises with the synergy S is also in-
tuitive, reecting that the opportunity cost of rejection rises in S. The reason why increased
uncertainty can cause an acquirer to reduce its o¤er is that greater uncertainty raises the
likelihood that low o¤ers are accepted. Further, the cost of having an o¤er rejected is not
too great when synergies are small, so the marginal cost of a lower o¤er is small, making
lower o¤ers optimal when synergies are small. If, instead, synergies are large, there is a
range where the o¤er initially rises in  because the acquirer does not want to risk a failed
o¤er. However, as the extent of uncertainty grows, the only way to ensure success is to
keep raising the o¤er, which eventually becomes too costly. Beyond this point, the marginal
increase in the probability that a higher o¤er succeeds is too small to justify increasing the
o¤er further, and the optimal o¤er C begins to fall with .
We can now solve for how the synergies and degree of uncertainty faced by the acquiring
rm a¤ect the equilibrium likelihood of a successful takeover. Substituting for C yields
Pr (C) =
8<:
0 if S  ^   (i)
S ^+
4
if ^   < S < ^+ 3 (ii)
1 if S  ^+ 3: (iii)
Proposition 10 The equilibrium probability of success falls with the degree of heterogeneity
^ and rises with the synergy S. If the synergy is less than the degree of heterogeneity, i.e., if
S < ^, then the success probability rises with the extent of uncertainty, . If, instead, the syn-
ergy exceeds the degree of heterogeneity, i.e., if S > ^, then the success probability falls with .
Few theories of takeovers provide a reason for why takeover bids sometimes fail. Greater
heterogeneity reduces the probability of successful o¤ers because higher o¤ers are needed for
success. Greater synergies induce the acquiring rm to raise its o¤er, increasing the proba-
bility of a successful o¤er. To understand why the probability of success rises with the extent
of uncertainty  when synergies are small, observe that when synergies are low, the realized
private valuation of the median target shareholder must be low for target shareholders to
accept an o¤er, and a higher  increases this probability. However, when synergies are high,
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but not so high that the acquiring rm nds it optimal to make an o¤er that always suc-
ceeds, the probability of success falls with . This occurs because the acquiring rm lowers
its o¤er, trading o¤ a reduced probability of success against the possibility of a better deal
if the realized private valuation of the median target shareholder turns out to be low.
A number of the comparative static results in Propositions 9 and 10 are testable. For
example, one can proxy the extent of heterogeneity in private valuations by the dispersion
in earnings forecasts of analysts or share price targets associated with investment banks and
other institutional investors. The propositions would then suggest that an acquiring rms
returns should be lower, ceteris paribus, when the variance of earnings forecasts or share
price targets is greater, and that such takeovers should be more likely to fail.
4.1 Share price dynamics over the takeover process
Any o¤er that is accepted with positive probability is always at a premium over the targets
stand-alone price, which is determined by the target shareholder with marginal valuation .
Following such an o¤er, the targets share price will rise to reect that (i) C > VT+, and (ii)
with probability S ^+
4
, we have C > VT + T , in which case the takeover succeeds. In this
case the targets share price will rise further to reect the benecial resolution of uncertainty
from the perspective of its marginal shareholder. However, with probability 3 S+^
4
the o¤er
is rejected, in which case the targets share price will fall to its pre-takeover value, VT + .
Moreover, a cash o¤er that appeals to the acquiring rms management also appeals
to its shareholders (Proposition 6). Hence, following a cash bid, the acquiring rms share
price will rise to reect the positive probability that the bid will succeed. The share price
would rise further upon acceptance, reecting the benecial resolution of takeover uncer-
tainty from the perspective of the acquirer; but fall to its level prior to the emergence of
synergies whenever its o¤er is rejected. Hence, we have the following testable predictions:
Corollary 4 Suppose that synergies are large but not too large, i.e., ^    < S < ^ + 3,
so that the equilibrium cash takeover o¤er is accepted with positive probability strictly less
than one. Then, the share prices of both the target and acquiring rms rise when synergies
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emerge and a cash bid is made, and rise further whenever a cash bid succeeds. Both rms
share prices fall whenever a cash o¤er fails.
If, instead, an acquirer makes an equity bid rather than cash, the targets share price
exhibits similar dynamics. However, the acquirers share price dynamics are unchanged only
if synergies are high enough that a successful takeover results in positive acquirer returns;
this requires both that S >  and for , the degree of uncertainty about the median target
shareholders value, to be small enough relative to other parameters. Otherwise, the acquir-
ing rms share price will fall after an equity takeover bid, and fall further if the takeover
succeeds. This prediction is the opposite of that implied by takeover theories based on asym-
metric information. Malmendier, Moretti and Peters (2012) observe that when an acquiring
rm has private information about its value, equity o¤ers would suggest that its stock is
overvalued, so that its share price could fall following an equity o¤er due to the bad news
revealed. However, subsequently, the acquirers share price should rise with approval as long
synergies are positive or if approval reects positive private target shareholder information;
and should fall when takeovers fail due to any negative information revealed by the rejection
about the acquirer and the loss of synergies. In contrast, in our setting, if an acquiring rms
stock price falls following an equity o¤er and there is uncertainty over whether the o¤er would
be accepted, then it should fall further following acceptance, but rise following rejection.
It is di¢ cult to test these predictions directly due to the endogeneity and selection is-
sues associated with accepted and rejected o¤ers (for example, outside of our model, the
takeover negotiation process may feature the possibility of a subsequent o¤er if an initial
o¤er is rejected). Savor and Lus (2009) insight was that one can get clean identication
by focusing on takeovers that fail for exogenous reasons, an approach that Masulis et al.
(2012) also employ. Then our model predicts that the acquirers share price should rise
back to its original level when the failure of a takeover is announced (as the transaction is
unwound). Consistent with our model, in the three day window around the announcement
of a takeovers failure, Savor and Lu nd abnormal acquirer returns of 3 percent, which just
o¤set the negative abnormal acquirers returns of 3 percent when a takeover with equity
was rst announced. These twin results provide strong conrmation of our theory.
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5 Diversication Discount
In this section, we investigate the foundations of the diversication discount" exploring
why mergers between less-related rms are associated with lower returns. To capture the
notion of  more-relatedand less-relatedrms we enhance our base model so that some
investors have positive private valuations of both rms. More-related rms are then those
in which more investors have positive private valuations for both rms.
To ease exposition, we simplify the model so that the economy is symmetric with
VA = VT  V . We consider three groups of investors. Group-one investors place values
V +A on rmA and V on rm T ; group-two investors place values V +T on rm T and V on
rm A; and group-three investors place the same value V + AT on both rms T and A. The
values of A, T , and AT in the population of investors are each uniformly distributed on [0; ].
Each investor has an equal amount of wealth, and their total wealth is W > 2V . We mea-
sure the closeness of the two rms with the fraction  2 [0; 1] of investors who have positive
private valuations of both rms. Thus, the total wealth of group-three investors is W , and
the remaining wealth (1 )W is divided evenly between group-one and group-two investors.
The symmetry that we assume is unimportant for the qualitative results, but it sim-
plies calculations and facilitates clean interpretations of how  a¤ects the diversication
discount. We show that the price of the merged rm rises with , and that when  is small
enough when the rms are more dissimilar from the perspective of most investors the
price of the merged rm is less than the collective stand-alone values of the two rms. The
extent of the diversication discount would only be greater were the private valuations of
group-three investors less correlated (e.g., independent).
We rst compute A and T , which determine the standalone market values of the rms.
In our symmetric setting, A = T in equilibrium. To see this, suppose without loss of gener-
ality that A > T instead. Then, types AT  T and types T  T hold the cheaper rm T ;
only types A  A hold rmA. As a result, the total wealth of shareholders of rm T exceeds
that of shareholders of rm A. But then the market-clearing conditions imply that the mar-
ket value of T exceeds that of A, contradicting the premise that A > T . Thus, A = T  .
30
The market-clearing conditions require that the wealth of AT   investors be divided evenly
between the two rms. Then, the market-clearing condition for each rm takes the form:
  


1  
2
+

2

W =
  

W
2
= V + ,
yielding
 =
W   2V
W + 2
. (27)
If the two rms merge through an equity o¤er if the acquirer o¤ers I in exchange for all
shares of T then just after the merger, group 3 investors value the joint rm by more than
group 1 and 2 investors with the same private valuation. Thus, trade will occur between
group 3 investors with private valuations below , who hold neither rm and have cash on
hand, and group 1 and 2 investors with private valuations slightly above . The joint rms
equilibrium market value of 2V + S + J is pinned down by the market-clearing condition.
That is, group 1 and 2 investors with private valuations between  and J sell their shares
to group 3 investors with private valuations between J
2
and . Thus, J 2 [; 2].
For simplicity, we assume that J < , which happens if there is su¢ cient dispersion in
the private valuations of investors, where the required extent of dispersion increases in .
A su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that W < 4V or  > W
2
. This assumption rules
out the corner solution of J = ; when such a solution obtains, the qualitative features of
our results do not change, but the algebra is more complicated because the market-clearing
condition for J ceases to hold with equality.
We now solve for J . Prior to the merger, group 3 investors divide their investments
evenly between the two rms, allocating =2 to each rm implying that the fraction of rm
A initially held by group 1 investors is (1  ). With the uniform distribution of private
valuations for investors, the fraction of the acquiring rm initially held by group 1 investors
with private valuations A 2 [; J ] is J   (1  ). So, too, the initial fraction of the target
held by group 2 investors with private valuations T 2 [; J ] is J   (1  ). Thus, just after
the merger (before any trading takes place), the fraction of the joint rm held by group 1
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and 2 investors with private valuations between  and J is
J   
   (1  )

1
1 + I
+
I
1 + I

=
J   
   (1  ) ;
which they can sell for
J   
   (1  ) (2V + S + J) :
The buyers are group 3 investors with private valuations AT 2 [ J2 ; J ], who have wealth
W
  1
2
J

:
Equating demand and supply yields:
J   
   (1  ) (2V + S + J) = W
  1
2
J

. (28)
In this symmetric setting with uniform uncertainty, the size I of the equity o¤er does not
enter the market-clearing condition (28). Dene   
1 
 
2
W . Substituting  by (27), yields
  
1  
W (+ V )
W   2V , (29)
which is monotonically increasing in , going from 0 to innity as  goes from 0 to 1.
Substituting in , the market-clearing condition simplies to
(J   ) (J + 2V + S) =  (2  J) . (30)
Equation (28) has a unique positive solution:
J =
1
2
h 
(2V + S +   )2 + 4 (2V + S + 2)0:5   (2V + S +   )i , (31)
where  is given by (27).
We denote by D the di¤erence between the sum of the two rms standalone market
values and the joint rms market value:
D = 2  J   S. (32)
When D is positive, it indicates that together the standalone market values of the two
rms exceeds the joint rms market value, i.e., that the combined return to the takeover
is negative. We next explore how  a¤ects D, and what it says about the diversication
discount.Substituting in (27) for  and (31) for J , we can solve for:
32
Lemma 7 The diversication discount is
D =
2W   4V
W + 2
  S 
1
2
24 2V + S +   W   2V
W + 2

2
+ 4
W   2V
W + 2
 (2V + S + 2)
!0:5
 

2V + S +   W   2V
W + 2

35 ,
where  is given by (29).
We now derive key properties of the diversication discount:
Proposition 11 The diversication discount D falls with . The maximal discount of
D = W 2V
W+2
 =    S occurs at  = 0, where rms are most dissimilar. For any  < 1,
there exists an S() > 0 such that for all S < S(), the discount is positive, i.e., D > 0.
One can interpret  as capturing the degree of similarity between industries in which
A and T operate. Then, the proposition indicates that, ceteris paribus, the diversication
discount is larger when the two rms are from less related industries (e.g., conglomerates),
which is consistent with the empirical facts.
The intuition for this result is closely related to that from the base model in which
there are only two groups of investors, where each group has a private valuation for only
one rm. This base model delivers the intuition that the diversication discount reects
the di¤erences in valuations between target and acquiring rm shareholders of each others
rm, and a merger dilutes a shareholders holdings of his preferred rm. When we allow for
investors with private valuations of both rms as we do here, this intuition extends in that
the diversication discount reects a measure of average di¤erences in valuations between
target and acquiring rm shareholders of each others rm. Moreover, the average di¤er-
ences in valuations" directly relate to the closenessof the two industries, which underlies
our result that the magnitude of the discount falls with the closeness of the two industries.
6 Conclusion
We integrate heterogeneity and uncertainty in investor valuations into a model of takeovers,
and study the choice of the acquiring rms manager between a cash or an equity o¤er. In
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the resulting equilibrium, share prices are determined via market-clearing conditions and
reect the valuations, wealth dynamics and optimizing behavior of all parties. Beyond char-
acterizing when o¤ers will feature equity or cash, our model also pins down the premia paid
for takeovers, target and acquiring rm returns, the probability a takeover succeeds, and
the patterns of share price dynamics following successful and unsuccessful takeovers.
Key to our analysis is the incorporation of heterogeneous investors on both sides of the
acquisition the buyer and the target and the strategic decisionmaking of the acquiring
rms manager. These elements combined allow us to reconcile an extensive array of empir-
ical regularities, and provide new testable predictions. For instance, our model implies that
combined target-acquirer returns are higher after cash acquisitions than after equity acqui-
sitions, when the method of payment is chosen optimally; shareholders in smaller acquiring
rms earn systematically more in acquisitions; and CEOs of acquiring rms with greater
shareholdings should be more likely to use cash. Our model also o¤ers a new explanation
for the diversication discountstemming from the di¤erences in the values acquiring and
target rm shareholders place on each others rms. It can also reconcile why an acquirers
share price tends to rise following a failed takeover.
An interesting feature to integrate to our model is the role of management of the target
rm. In our model, target managements private valuation plays no role because manage-
ment has no inuence on the takeover outcome. However, it becomes important once target
management has private information about target assets, and can make recommendations
to shareholders about whether to accept or reject an o¤er. From this perspective, one could
endogenize whether a tender or merger o¤er is made based on the expectation of managerial
support or resistance to an o¤er, which would then have implications for the probability
of acceptance conditional on target managements endorsement (i.e., a merger) or re-
sistance (i.e., a hostile tender o¤er). Given that target managements recommendation
is likely driven by both its private valuation (management and shareholder interests can
diverge) and its private information (management and shareholder interests are aligned),
target shareholders should be able to partially infer its managements private information
from its recommendation, which, in turn, inuences their voting decisions. In turn, target
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managements role inuences an acquiring rms o¤er.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The indi¤erence condition (5) yields
I
1 + I
=
VT + 

E
VT + VA + S + max (J ; 

E)
, (33)
which gives
~PJI
   PT = VT + VA + S + J
1 + I
I   VT   T
=
VT + VA + S + J
VT + VA + S + max (J ; 

E)
(VT + 

E)  VT   T .
Next we provide a general proof for the proposition without imposing A1. Consider two
cases. (1) J  E. Then ~PJI PT = E T > 0, establishing the proposition. (2) J < E.
Then, because J is between T and A, the condition A  T yields J  T . Thus, we have
~PJI
   PT = VT + VA + S + J
VT + VA + S + E
(VT + 

E)  VT   T (34)
 VT + VA + S + T
VT + VA + S + E
(VT + 

E)  VT   T
= VT + 

E  
(E   T ) (VT + E)
VT + VA + S + E
  VT   T
=
(E   T ) (VA + S)
VT + VA + S + E
> 0,
establishing the proposition. Next, suppose the median target shareholders valuation is
known (E is constant) and consider how the premium varies as VA rises. Assume both A
and S are nondecreasing in VA. First assume VA is small enough that J < 

E. Rewrite
equation (34) as
~PJI
   PT =

1  

E   J
VT + VA + S + E

(VT + 

E)  VT   T .
Then, as VA increases, VT + VA + S + E increases while 

E   J does not increase (but is
still positive). Thus

1  E J
VT+VA+S+

E

increases and hence ~PJI   PT . When VA increases
to a critical value such that J = 

E, ~PJI
   PT = E   T . If VA increases further beyond
that, ~PJI   PT stays constant. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: To prove the rst part of the lemma, suppose the conclusion is false,
i.e., that ~PJ  VT + VA + S   C + C , so that C = VT + C . After a successful cash o¤er,
original shareholders of the acquiring rm for whom VA + VT + S + A   C < PJ want
to sell their shares. The value of their shares is PJ ~FA(min f(PJ   VA   VT   S + C) ; Ag).
Substituting for PJ and C, the value of their shares is at least
(VT + VA + S   C + C) ~FA (min fC ; Ag) = (VA + S) ~FA (min fC ; Ag)
 (VA + S) ~FA
 
min

lT ; A
	
.
On the demand side, shareholders of the original target for whom VA+VT +S+T C > PJ
wish to buy shares in the joint rm, and they have cash not exceeding C = VT + C 
VT + 
h
T to invest. Thus, equating total demand with the value of the shares supplied yields 
VT + 
h
T
  (VA + S) ~FA  minlT ; A	, contradicting the lemmas premise, thus establish-
ing the rst part of the lemma. The proof of the second part of the lemma is in the text. 
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove the rst statement, suppose instead that C  PT =
VT +  < VT + 

C . Then the median target shareholder must hold the joint rm, i.e., equa-
tion (13) (i) must hold. Note that (VT + VA + S   C + C)C increases in C for C 2 [0; PT ]
under VA > PT   S. Therefore, from equation (13) (i),
VT + 

C =
VT + VA + S   C + C
PJ
C  VT + VA + S   PT + 

C
PJ
PT
=
VA + S + 

C   T
PJ
(VT + T )
 VA + S + 

C   
VT + VA + S + T   C
(VT + T ) ;
where the rst equality follows from PT = VT + T and the second follows from PJ 
VT + VA + S + min (T ; A)  C and T  A. From this, we have
C  VT + VA + S + T  
VT + T
VT + C
(VA + S + 

C   T )
= PT + (

C   T )
VA + S   PT
VT + C
 PT ;
a contradiction.
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To prove the second statement, examine equation (13) (i):
C = (VT + C)
PJ
VT + VA + S   C + C
 (VT + C)
VT + VA + S   C + T
VT + VA + S   C + C
= (VT + 

C) 
(C   T ) (VT + C)
VT + VA + S   C + C
 (VT + C) 
VT + 

C
VA + S
(C   T ) :
Rearranging, we have
C   (VT + C)   
VT + 

C
VA + S
(C   T ) :
Taking limits on both sides yields
lim
VT+
h
T
VA+S
(hT T )!0
C   (VT + T )  0.
However, because C  (VT + C), we also have limVT+hT
VA+S
(hT T )!0
C   (VT + C)  0.
Thus, the relationship must hold as an equality. 
Proof of Lemma 2: Note that for all E 2

lT ; 
h
T

, EAM (E) AM = FT (E)  (E), where
 (E) = S +
MA   E
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S)  MA
= S +
 
MA
VT + VA + S + E
  1
VT+VA+S
E
+ 1
!
(VA + S)  MA . (35)
Note that if E = 
l
T , then FT (

E) = 0 and 
E
AM (

E) = AM , this proves the if" part by
contradiction. We next prove the only if part by contradiction. Suppose instead that
EAM (

E) = AM , then  (

E) = 0. Equation (35) shows  (E) strictly falls in E. Then


E =
T+

E
2

> 0. As FT

E =
T+

E
2

> 0, we have EAM

E =
T+

E
2

> AM . This
contradicts the optimality of E. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Note that for all E 2

lT ; 
h
T

, we have
EAM (E)  AM  FT (E)

S +
MA   E
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S)  MA

= FT (E)
"
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + E
S +
 
MA   E

VA
VT + VA + S + E
  MA
#
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= FT (E)

VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + E
S   VT + S + E
VT + VA + S + E
MA  
VA
VT + VA + S + E
E

= FT (E)
VT + VA + S + 
M
A
VT + VA + S + E

S   VT + S + E
VT + VA + S + MA
MA  
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
E

.
To prove the rst part of the proposition, note that if S  VT+S+hT
VT+VA+S+
M
A
MA +
VA
VT+VA+S+
M
A
hT ,
then EAM
 
E =
1
2
lT +
1
2
hT
   AM > 0. As EAM (E)  EAM  E = 12lT + 12hT , it fol-
lows that EAM (

E) > AM . To prove the second part, note that if J  lT , then (??)
holds with equality. If S  VT+S+lT
VT+VA+S+
M
A
MA +
VA
VT+VA+S+
M
A
lT , then 
E
AM (E)   AM  0
for all E 2

lT ; 
h
T

. Thus, EAM (

E)   AM  0. As EAM (E)   AM  0, we have
EAM (

E)  AM = 0. Thus, by Lemma 2, the acquirers optimal o¤er is never approved. 
Proof of Lemma 4: Refer to equation (21) and note that (VT + S   C) strictly decreases
in C while pro(C(C)  T ) is continuous in C. The proof follows from a similar argument
as that of Lemma 2. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Refer to equation (23). If S > lT , 
C
AM
 
C = VT +
1
2
lT +
1
2
S
 AM >
0. As CAM (C
)  CAM
 
C = VT +
1
2
lT +
1
2
S

, it follows that CAM (C
) > AM . The result
then follows from Lemma 4. 
Proof of Proposition 3: For all T 2

lT ; 
h
T

, dene CAM(

T )  CAM(C = VT + T ).
Then, for all T , we have
CAM(C
)  EAM(I)  FT (T )

MA   T  
MA   T
VT + VA + S + T
(VA + S)

= FT (

T )
 
MA   T
 VT + T
VT + VA + S + T
, (36)
where (17) and (23) are used. This expression is nonnegative for all T 2

lT ; 
h
T

if MA  hT ,
and in particular, CAM (

E)  EAM (E). As CAM (C)  CAM (E), we have CAM (C) 
EAM (

E). This proves the rst part. To prove the second part, note that if the median tar-
get shareholder does not hold the joint rm (e.g., if hT  A), then (36) holds with equality:
CAM(

T )  EAM(T ) = FT (T )
 
MA   T
 VT + T
VT + VA + S + T
.
Thus, if MA  lT , CAM (T )  EAM (T ) for all T 2

lT ; 
h
T

, and hence, CAM (

C)  EAM (C).
As EAM (

E)  EAM (C), we have EAM (E)  CAM (C). 
39
Proof of Proposition 4: Follows directly from Result 3. 
Proof of Lemma 6: We have from equations (11) and (3) that
PJ   PA = VT + VA + S + J
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S)  (VA + A)
= (VA + S)  

E   J
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S)  (VA + A)
= S   A  
E   J
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S)
 S   A  
E  max (A; T )
VT + VA + S + E
(VA + S) . (37)
Note the right-hand-side of equation (37) is decreasing in E for 

E 2

lT ; 
h
T

, thus
PJ   PA  S   A  
lT  max (A; T )
VT + VA + S + lT
(VA + S) ,
which, combined with the condition A  T , establishes the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Let E be the median target shareholder value corresponding to
the equity o¤er. If the success probability is strictly positive, Lemma 2 and equation (??)
in the proof of Lemma 3 yield:
S >
VT + S + 

E
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
E. (38)
Next, consider a case in which A = T  , and consider the limiting case in which hT is
arbitrarily close to . Then E approaches . Then the RHS of (38) equals
VT + S + 
VT + VA + S + MA
MA +
VA
VT + VA + S + MA
 =
(VT + S) 
M
A + 
M
A + VA
VT + VA + S + MA
<
(VT + S) + 
M
A + VA
VT + VA + S + MA
= .
It then follows that there exists S such that the RHS of (38) < S < : In light of (38), an
equity o¤er can be made that maximizes the payo¤ of the acquirers management and has
a strictly positive probability of success. Furthermore, in light of Proposition 3, the equity
o¤er is preferred to a cash o¤er. In addition, from (9), we have RE < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Since the marginal holder of the joint rm in a cash o¤er has a
private valuation of at least A, the price of the joint rm satises
PJ  VA + VT + S   C + A = PA + VT + S   C.
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Using (21) and Lemma 4, we have
VT + S   C > 0.
Combining these inequalities yields PJ > PA. 
Proof of Proposition 7 and 8: Follows from the same arguments as in the proofs of
Result 4 and Corollary 1. 
Proof of Proposition 9: Follows directly from equation (26). Note that the condition in
the third bullet of the proposition is S < ^, which di¤ers from the condition S < ^ + 3,
as in the second line of equation (26) because in the proposition we consider what happens
when  increases from zero. 
Proof of Proposition 11. We use (30) to prove the proposition. To show D monotoni-
cally decreases in , suppose 1  1 > 2  0. Denote the corresponding values of  by 1
and 2, and those of J by J;1 and J;2. Note also that  is independent of . Then (30)
gives
 
J;2   
  
J;2 + 2V + S

= 2
 
2  J;2

. The three terms J;2  , J;2 + 2V +S, and
2  J;2 are positive. Thus, 1 > 2 yields
 
J;2   
  
J;2 + 2V + S

< 1
 
2  J;2

. Next,
note J;1 satises
 
J;1   
  
J;1 + 2V + S

= 1
 
2  J;1

. We now show that J;1 > J;2.
Suppose instead that J;1  J;2. Then 
J;1   
  
J;1 + 2V + S
   J;2     J;2 + 2V + S < 1  2  J;2  1  2  J;1 ;
which contradicts the condition
 
J;1   
  
J;1 + 2V + S

= 1
 
2  J;1

. Therefore, J
monotonically increases in . In light of (32) and the fact that  is independent of , D
monotonically increases in . Next, note that (30) yields J = 2 if  = 1. Because J
monotonically increases in  as we have shown above, J < 2 for all  < 1, which, combined
with (32), establishes the rest of the proof. 
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